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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In this appeal, Mr. Nichols has raised several claims on
challenges to the sufficiency of the State's evidence to establish

including
delicti of the

charged offense and a claim of fundamental error regarding the trial court's failure to
instruct the jury regarding corpus delicti. Following the filing of the Respondent's Brief
in this case, the Idaho Supreme Court issued an Opinion in State v. Suriner', which
eliminated the corpus delicti requirement in Idaho and left no remaining standard
requiring corroboration of a confession in its wake.
This Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that retroactive application of the holding
in Suriner that eliminated the corpus delicti rule to Mr. Nichols' case in this appeal would
constitute a due process violation, and therefore the merits of Mr. Nichols' claims
regarding corpus delicti must be adjudicated under the legal standards that existed prior
to the elimination of this requirement. In addition, this Reply Brief is necessary to clarify
that, under the pertinent legal standards, the State presented insufficient evidence to
establish the corpus delicti of the charged offense.
While Mr. Nichols continues to assert error in the district court's admission of
hearsay as to the alleged victim's age, the failure of the trial court to properly instruct the
jury as to the elements of statutory rape and as to corpus delicti, and in the
prosecutorial misconduct occurring during closing arguments, he will rely on the briefing
contained within the Appellant's Brief regarding these issues, and will not reiterate his
arguments herein.

1

State v. Suriner, 154 Idaho 81 (2013).

1

The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Nichols's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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1.

the district
Nichols' Rule 29 motion
judgment of acquittal
presented insufficient
establish the corpus deliciti independent of Mr. Nichols' confession?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Nichols' Rule 29 Motion Seeking A
Judgment Of Acquittal Because The State Presented Insufficient Evidence To Establish
The Corpus Deliciti Of The Charged Offense independent Of Mr. Nichols' Confession

A.

Introduction
During the pendency of this appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court in Suriner held that

it was eliminating the corpus delicti rule in Idaho and establishing no other rule requiring

corroboration or trustworthiness in its place prior to the admission or use of a confession
in order to sustain a finding of guilt of a charged offense.

However, because this

holding was both unexpected and indefensible under prior standards of law in Idaho,
Mr. Nichols asserts that it would violate his constitutional right to due process for the
elimination of the corpus delicti requirement from the State's burden of proof to be
applied to his case.
Under the standards for corpus delicti as it existed in Idaho prior to the issuance
of the Suriner Opinion, Mr. Nichols further asserts that the State presented insufficient
evidence of corroboration at trial, and that the State's purported grounds of
corroboration are likewise insufficient to meet this standard.

B.

It Would Violate Constitutional Principles Of Due Process To Apply The
Elimination Of The Corpus Delicti Requirement From The Opinion In Suriner To
Mr. Nichols' Case

It is well established that the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws
precludes a legislative enactment from being applied retroactively to a criminal
defendant where that action, among other things, operates so as to alter the legal rules
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of evidence so as to receive different or less testimony than the law required at the time
e.g., Carmel! v.

of the commission of the alleged offense.

529 U

513,

1-522 (2000); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1990). Although the
Post Facto clauses of the State and federal constitutions apply by their terms only to

legislative enactments

provisions,

Fifth Amendment of the United

Constitution provides similar protections with regard to judicial actions that
similar manner.

Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191-192 (1977).

in a
This due

process protection emanates from the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, and "is

on the notion that persons have the right to fair warning of

that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties."

/d.; see also

v.

Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 374 n.8 (2010).

The United States Supreme Court made this clear in Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347 (1964).

In Bouie, the Court held that, "[t]here can be no doubt that a

deprivation of the right of fair warning can result not only from vague statutory language
but also from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise
statutory language." Bouie, 378 U.S. at 352. The Bouie Court further expanded on the
nature of such a due process violation when a reviewing court unexpectedly alters the
common law to a defendant's detriment:
Indeeed, an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute,
applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law, such as
Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution forbids. An ex post facto law has been
defined by this Court as one "that makes an action done before the
passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and
which punishes such action" or "that aggravates a crime. or makes it
greater than it was, when committed." If a state legislature is barred by
the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it must follow that a
State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving
precisely the same result by judicial construction. The fundamental
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as
If a judicial
construction of a criminal statute is "unexpected and indefensible by
reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in
issue," it must not be given retroactive effect.
Id. at 353-354 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Subsequent to Bouie, the United States Supreme Court recognized that this due
process protection extends not only to judicial interpretations of statutes, but also to
judicial alterations of protections that existed only at common law.

See Rogers v.

Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001). The Couri in Rogers held that a judicial alteration of

the prior existing common law cannot be retroactively applied under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment where that alteration is "unexpected and indefensible by
reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct at issue." Id. at
462. In making this determination, the Rogers Court looked to factors such as whether
the common law at issue retained current justification for its on-going existence,
whether it had been given meaningful effect in prior decisions (as opposed to being
mentioned in passing and as dicta), whether the common law rule involved a
substantive right, and whether the alteration of the reviewing court was consistent with
the actions undertaken in other jurisdictions. Id. at 462-467.
Although the standard articulated in Rogers with regard to when a due process
violation is established is broad in its sweep, the prior Opinion in Bouie - which formed
the basis for the Rogers Opinion - provides clearer guidance.

In Bouie, the U.S.

Supreme Court clarified that, "[w]hen a state court overrules a consistent line of
procedural decisions with the retroactive effect of denying a litigant a hearing in a
pending case, it thereby deprive him of due process of law 'in its primary sense of an
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opportunity to be heard and to defend (his) substantive right.'" Bouie, 378
(quoting

Brinkerhoff~Faris

(emphasis added).

Trust and

Co. v. Hill,

1 U

In other words, where there is an

354
678 (1930))

line of case law

wherein a substantive right has been recognized by the courts, an
consistent

of holdings cannot be retroactively applied to

departure
criminal

defendant under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Lancaster v.
Metrish, 683 F.3d 740,744 (6th Cir. 2012).

It was this standard that led the Supreme Court of Colorado to conclude that its
judicial abrogation of the corpus delicti requirement could not be applied retroactively
under due process principles.

In People v. LaRosa, the Supreme Court of Colorado

had occasion to revisit the on-going viability of the corpus delicti rule in the context of a
case where the only corroboration of a defendant's confession of sexual assault was the
opportunity for the defendant to have committed the offense. People v. LaRosa, 293
P.3d 567, 570-579 (Colo. 2013). After a discussion of the roots of the corpus delicti rule
under the Colorado common law, the Colorado Supreme Court ultimately abandoned
this rule in favor of a more general trustworthiness standard. Id. However, this did not
end the discussion regarding the disposition of the LaRosa case: the Colorado Supreme
Court still had to resolve whether this alteration could be applied retroactively under the
Due Process Clause.
The LaRosa Court determined that it could not.

In LaRosa, the Court first

distinguished the abolition of the corpus delicti rule from the common law rule at issue in
the Rogers Opinion. LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 578-579.

In particular, the LaRosa Court

noted that the common law rule at issue in Rogers was characterized as a "substantive
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principle" of law, "'in name only' because it had never been enforced" in any state court
I

the

and "had never

and had only been mentioned in three cases, each time in dicta." Id. at 579

(quoting Rogers, 532 U.S.
had

as a ground of decision in any homicide prosecution in

464).

Although recognizing that the corpus delicti rule

subject to some criticism, the Colorado Supreme Court nevertheless

recognized that the rule had been in actual force in several jurisdictions, including the
court's own prior decisions. Id. In fact, the LaRosa Court noted

the corpus delicti

rule had been the substantive law in Colorado for over one hundred years.

Id.

Accordingly, because overturning this rule was a clear, and therefore unexpected, break
from well-established case law, the Court in LaRosa he!d that it would violate due
process to apply the elimination of this rule to those whose convictions arose prior to its
decision. As such, the Court in LaRosa reversed the defendant's conviction. Id.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Utah has also held that it would be
unconstitutional to apply the elimination of its common law corpus delicti rule
retroactively to those whose offenses arose prior to the court's decision. See State v.
Mauch/ey, 67 P.3d 477 (Utah 2003). Moreover, the conclusion that the elimination of

the corpus delicti rule cannot be retroactively applied is consistent with prior decisions
from the Supreme Court of Idaho in a related context.
In State v. Byers, the Idaho Supreme Court eliminated the common law
requirement of corroboration of an alleged victim's allegation of rape in prosecutions for
this offense. State v. Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 160-165 (1981). However, in doing so the
Court recognized that it was altering the quantum of proof required in order to establish
this offense. Id. at 165-167. In light of this, the Byers Court held that the corroboration
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rule must be followed with regard to the defendant in that

along with those who

were tried prior to the issuance of the Court's opinion. Id.
The Court in Byers so held because, "[t]o apply today's decision in passing on
validity of Syers' conviction would be the equivalent of applying an ex post facto law,
and is within the prohibitions of Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution and Art.
I, § 16 of our Idaho Constitution." Id. at 166. The Byers Court recognized that the
elimination of the corroboration requirement, "alters the rules of evidence such that 'less
or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense
(is necessary) in order to convict the offender.'"

Id. (quoting Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354)

(alterations in the original).

In light of this,

Byers Court held that the newly

announced

the

requirement,

rule

eliminating

corroboration

"is to

be

applied

prospectively to criminal trials commenced hereafter." Id. at 167.
As with Byers, Idaho courts prior to Suriner had consistently recognized the
corpus delicti rule in Idaho - dating back over one hundred years to its adoption in
State v. Keller in 1902.2 See, e.g., State v. Tiffany, 139 Idaho 909 (2004); State v. Urie,
92 Idaho 71 (1968); State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699 (1902); State v. Roth, 138 Idaho 820
(Ct. App. 2003). And, like LaRosa, this rule was not one that had never had substantive
force in Idaho - the requirements of corpus delicti were unequivocally recognized as
part of the State's burden of proof of the charged offense at trial. See, e.g., Thomas v.
State, 145 Idaho 765, 771 (Ct. App. 2008); Roth, 138 Idaho at 822.

By appellate counsel's count, there are approximately 70 cases in Idaho that have
analyzed and applied the corpus delicti rule in Idaho as part of its substantive law. For
sake of brevity, only a sampling of cases are cited herein.
2
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Moreover, the elimination of the corpus delicti rule in Idaho under Suriner is
particularly unexpected, given that the Idaho Supreme Court has left no standard of
corroboration in its wake in order for a conviction to be sustained on the basis of a
confession alone. In eliminating the corpus delicti rule in Idaho, the Suriner Court held

Because the harm caused by the rule exceeds whatever benefits there
may be, we hold that the corpus delicti rule no longer applies in Idaho.
see no reason
Instead, the jury can give a defendant's extrajudicial confession or
statement whatever weight it deems appropriate along with all of the other
evidence when deciding whether the State has proved guilt beyond
reasonable doubt
Suriner, 154 Idaho at 88 (emphasis added).

This represents a drastic departure, not only from over a hundred years of prior
established jurisprudence in Idaho, but with the general requirements for admission of
or use of a confession in order to establish guilt throughout the country. "Courts adhere
almost universally to the principle that 'an extrajudicial confession, by itself, is not
sufficient to sustain a conviction for a crime.'"

Mauchley, 67 P.3d 477, 481 (quoting

State v. Weldon, 314 P.2d 353, 354 (1957)) (emphasis added). This nearly universal

requirement of additional corroboration was further reflected in LaRosa, wherein the
Supreme Court of Colorado recognized that, "[a]lmost all courts adhere to a
corroboration requirement, which requires the prosecution to present corroborating
evidence of a defendant's confession to either allow for its admission into evidence or
sustain a conviction." LaRosa, 293 P.3d 567, 571 (emphasis added).
Although the modern trend has been to adopt a general trustworthiness standard
with regard to the admission and use of criminal confessions, the fact remains that
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requirement

corroboration remains in nearly all jurisdictions with regard to a
Accordingly, the Opinion in Suriner also represents a

departure from the case law in nearly all jurisdictions in that there is now no standard
that has supplanted corpus delicti in ensuring the reliability and factual corroboration of
a criminal confession - or its use as the sole proof of guilt in a criminal case.
Finally, a clear indication that the elimination of corpus delicti in Idaho should not
be retroactively applied comes from the Suriner Court itself. In the Suriner Opinion, the
Idaho Supreme Court did not apply its decision to eliminate the corpus delicti rule to the
defendant's own case

rather, the Court first analyzed whether the traditional legal

standards of corpus delicti had been met in the defendant's case before proceeding to
eliminate the rule. Suriner, 154 Idaho at 1095-1098. Had the rule eliminating corpus
delicti been intended to apply retroactively, the Suriner Court would have applied it in
Mr. Suriner's case, and would not have applied the prior rule in that case. Based upon
the Suriner Court's implicit decision not to do so, this indicates that the elimination of the
corpus delicti rule was not intended to operate retroactively.

C.

Under The Standards For Corpus Delicti Under Idaho Law Prior To The
Elimination Of This Requirement, The State Presented Insufficient Evidence Of
Corroboration Of Mr. Nichols' Confession
Mr. Nichols asserts that, under the standards required to establish the corpus

delicti of the charged offense, the State presented insufficient evidence to apart from

Mr. Nichol'S own admissions to police to establish corroboration.
The State has first asserted that the mere opportunity to commit the offense is
itself corroboration. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10.) This assertion is in error. In order
to establish the corpus delicti of the charged offense in Idaho, the State bears the
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burden to show either the charged injury or the criminal agency
opportunity to commit the charged

and the mere

not meet either prong. See Roth, 138

Idaho at 822-823; LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 571-579; People v. Robson, 80 P.3d 912, 913
(Colo. App. 2003); State v. Campbell, 178 P.3d 337, 340 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); State v.
Ray, 926 P.2d 904, 907 (Wash. 1996). The reason behind this was stated succinctly by

the Oregon Court of Appeals in Campbell - "The evidence showing that defendant had
an

to commit the

establishes only

that~that

he had

opportunity; it does not tend to establish that the offenses actually occurred." Campbell,
1

the

argument

existed additional "corroboration" due

uivocal circumstances" under which Mr. Nichols was found in the alleged
victim's

is similarly misplaced. While there was testimony as to the alleged

victim's

and Mr. Nichols' age, the only evidence as to any relationship between

them in the record

or relied upon by the State in this appeal - comes directly from

Mr. Nichols' own confession to the police. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11 (citing to
Tr., p.85, L.7 - p.87, L.24; p.95, L.9 - 98, L.1.) The corpus delicti rule requires that the
corroboration come from a source aside from the confession itself. See Suriner, 154
Idaho at 83. As was set noted by the Court in Suriner, the corpus delicti rule requires
that, "'there must be some evidence or corroborating circumstances tending to show
that a crime has been committed, aside from such confessions or statements," Id.
While multiple confessions to third parties may suffice for this rule, using the confession
itself to "corroborate" the confession does not.
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Id. at 1095-1098.

Otherwise, there

would

corpus delicti rule

all

requirement

no

mere internal

suffice.
that the

reliance on
entirely unknown

victim

unidentified

cannot

Brief, p.n.) A review of

stand as

testimony at trial shows that

was literally nothing of the nature, subject matter, tenor or timing of these
statements that was placed into evidence

the jury

and without any sUbstance of

remarks at all, there can be no corroboration of either criminal agency or injury as
is required to sustain proof of corpus delicti.
The
in

to establish any proof of the corpus delicti of

Court reverse

p.110,Ls.6-18.)
charged offense

at trial. Accordingly, Mr. Nichols

burden

is

Tr., p.70, Ls.1

conviction for

that this

with prejud

CONCLUSION
Mr. Nichols respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction for
statutory rape with prejudice, as there was insufficient evidence of the charged offense.
In the alternative, Mr. Nichols respectfully requests that this Court reverse his judgment
of conviction and sentence and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of May, 2013.

'SffRAH E. TOMPKINS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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